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Peirce's Semeiotics: A Methodology for Bridging the 
Material-Ideational Divide in IR Scholarship 
 
1 Introduction 
Within the interpretive turn in IR scholarship an understanding emerged that material 
objects are in-and-of-themselves meaningless, and acquire meaning only as a result of the 
intersubjective processes of meaning making that humans impose upon things. Yet, 
things can at times impose their meanings upon us. They are not purely passive, and can 
acquire agentic dimensions of their own. Take the example of a drone (Holmqvist, 2013). 
It video streams real-time images of distant places into the control room of the drone 
operator. As it does so, it provides the technical means to kill from a distance (or to 
survey wildlife in a national park), while the images it conveys to the drone operator 
leave an irreducible impression upon her/him. Many drone operators suffer from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, which the American Army certainly would like to avoid, if 
only it knew how. The images transmitted by drones contain a certain materiality, a 
factuality, which reaches beyond interpretations and reinterpretations. These images are 
thus at least partly located outside of the hermeneutic circle. They differ from a movie in 
that they indexically transmit real life events that are happening in that very moment 
elsewhere, and which are tied to the actions of the drone operator. They provide the 
technical means to perform certain acts, and they provoke certain kinds of emotions. The 
purpose of the present paper is to develop a systematic methodology that allows us to 
study how material signs can at least partly create meaning without that we would have to 
rely on entirely ideational arguments about the social world.  
A rising number of scholars in international relations have reintroduced 
materiality into their accounts of socially meaningful action. Practice scholars highlight 
how embodied practices are simultaneously material and ideational (Adler and Pouliot, 
2011; Adler-Nissen, 2012; Bueger and Gadinger, 2015; Hopf, 2010). Actor-network 
theorists argue that artefacts are not simply objects, but actants, which shape the 
behaviours of human beings (Best and Walters, 2013). Others reach much further and 
attribute a certain independent vitality to matter, with which they explain a vast array of 
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phenomena, including the impressions garbage leaves on us, the operations of electricity 
grids, and the effects of food on our moods (Bennett, 2010). We can loosely group these 
strands of scholarship under the heading of New Materialisms, even as the authors differ 
on the degree of autonomy, agency, and effects they attribute to matter (Coole and Frost, 
2010; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Srnicek et al., 2013). Common to all New 
Materialists is the view that matter plays an irreducible role in social relations and does 
not entirely depend upon what people make of it. At the same time, New Materialists take 
seriously the poststructuralist critiques of the old materialisms of realist and some strands 
of Marxist scholarship. They thus avoid a purely functionalist account of materiality 
devoid of meaning-making. Various strands of New Materialism have produced an 
impressive range of theoretical and empirical contributions that highlight the 
interpenetration of the material and the ideational. Yet, to date no sustained debate has 
taken place about the methodological foundations of such an undertaking.   
The present paper makes a start in developing a systematic methodology for the New 
Materialisms. To be sure, the paper is less ambitious in its scope than the full spectrum of 
New Materialism. Notably it falls short in providing a methodology for vitalist claims, 
which attribute a certain life force to matter. The purpose of the paper is to highlight 
ways in which we can study the meanings materiality can create in processes of 
signification without having to resort to purely ideational modes of analysis, or being 
trapped in an exclusively functionalist and mechanical understanding of materiality. It 
proposes conceiving of embodied practices and things as material signs that can 
sometimes communicate more abstract concepts and structures directly, without the 
intervention of discourse or background knowledge. I introduce Peircean semeiotics to 
accomplish this. Peircean semeiotics can retain a sign’s materiality, taking into account 
that how material things signify differs from the conventional understanding of how 
language signifies, namely by arbitrary social convention. To be sure, material things can 
signify by arbitrary social convention (humans can impose meaning upon things), but 
they can also signify by similitude. Rene Magritte drew attention to this often forgotten 
process of signification in his painting Ceci n’est pas une pipe: A painting of a pipe is not 
actually a pipe, but a sign that refers to a pipe (Foucault, 1983). Furthermore, signs can 
signify by being causally connected to the object they represent, which is their indexical 
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dimension. Through satellite relays a drone’s video images get sent to the control station, 
and by virtue of this indexical connection they represent the surveillance target. In 
Peircean semeiotics the relation by which a sign represents a particular object is separate 
from how a sign is interpreted. The three forms of signification (by social convention, by 
similitude, by causation/contiguity) can be interpreted by provoking a thought in the 
person who notices them, but they can also provoke an emotion or an action—that is, 
they can provoke a response that has a material impact on the world. Humans can change 
matter. The drone operator can fire and develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as he/she 
observes the consequences of his or her actions. 
While Peircean semeiotics provides a potential platform for integrating materialist 
analytical tools and discourse analysis approaches into a single framework, it also differs 
fundamentally from both. Different from discourse analysis, it suggests not only that 
language affects how we see the world, but also that what we see in the world affects our 
modes of communication. Peircean semeiotics deviates from old materialists’ typical 
understanding that signs objectively represent an independent reality by highlighting that 
even though there can be a direct causal relation between the signs we observe and the 
material objects those signs are supposed to represent, such a causal relation is not a 
necessity. 
While available materialist and discourse analysis tools have their own raison d’être, 
they have some limitations for analyzing specific phenomena. These limitations become 
particularly apparent in the analysis of artifacts – a seldom-studied phenomenon in IR, 
perhaps because an appropriate research apparatus has been lacking. Take the example of 
a gun. Following realist premises the possession of weapons exerts power because of 
their potential to kill, but guns can serve numerous other social purposes. For instance, in 
the seventeenth century differences in rank (and wealth) within an army were expressed 
in the luxurious ways in which officers’ weapons were decorated, not in their superior 
killing power. Furthermore, many aristocrats established weapons collections to exhibit 
the honour and good taste of their family.1 In another case the very same weapons serve 
in an exhibition, as the historical testimony of a bygone era. The symbolic and functional 
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 Imperial Armory, Military Historical Institute, Schwarzenberg Palace, Prague, Czech Republic, Visit on 
the 26th of December 2012  
 4 
purposes of a gun vary, and yet they are limited by its very materiality. A gun is not a 
useful device for learning how to swim, and it cannot symbolize the medical 
achievements obtained in cancer treatment. In Webb’s (2003: 411) words, “the goal is to 
open up social analysis to the historicity and social power of material things without 
reducing them either to being only vehicles of meaning, on the one hand, or ultimate 
determinants, on the other.” 
The present paper proposes Peirce’s semeiotics as one possible methodological 
apparatus for achieving this goal. It first highlights that more work needs to be done in 
the methodological realm in order to catch up with the significant theoretical 
achievements New Materialists obtained in transcending Cartesian dualism. Subsequently 
the paper highlights the ontology of a Peircean semeiotics with its focus on the 
interpenetrated nature of the ideational and the material. It then develops a specific 
research method and strategy derived from the tools provided by Peircean semeiotics, 
with a particular emphasis on the index as a sign that represents through 
causal/contiguous connection and the icon as a sign that represents by similarity, while 
simultaneously maintaining with the symbol a sign that represents its object because of a 
social convention that it does so. The last section demonstrates how Peirce’s semeiotics 
can be applied to analyse GDP as an inscription device—a material sign that physically 
inscribes elements of reality on paper and into computer programs.  
Before proceeding, a note of caution is called for. The goal of the present analysis is 
not to provide an authoritative account of Peirce’s theory, but to demonstrate the 
usefulness of Peirce’s semeiotics as a tool for International Relations analysis. Peirce’s 
insights are scattered across a range of long and short writings, and the lack of single, 
synthetic work makes indentifying a unified account difficult. On the one hand this has 
led to a considerable neglect of his work (Hookway, 1985; Short, 2007; Short, 2004). On 
the other hand it has contributed to significant disagreements among Peirce scholars 
about how to interpret the often incomplete and at times contradictory sketches Peirce has 
bequeathed to posterity (see for example Liszka, 1996; Short, 1996; Short, 2004). Instead 
of arbitrating between competing interpretations of Peirce’s work, I highlight how a 
Peirce-inspired methodology can solve some of the emerging issues in IR scholarship. 
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2 IR methodological approaches seeking to bridge Cartesian 
dualism 
 
The New Materialisms avoid the Cartesian dualism between the ideational and the 
material, which has haunted IR scholarship for so long with poststructuralists, 
postmodernists and some constructivists (among others Ashley and Walker, 1990; 
Kratochwil, 2000) on one end of the spectrum and neorealists and historical materialists 
on the other end (see for example Krasner, 2000; Wallerstein, 1979; Waltz, 1979).2 
Matter partly creates meaning on its own terms and has constitutive effects on embodied 
humans, who are fully immersed within its purview. Humans, in turn, shape matter 
through their actions. “Consciousness emerges from, yet remains enmeshed in, this 
material world” (Coole 2010: 101). 
Despite this important message, the New Materialisms have not yet moved 
beyond the observation that matter operates as an actant, is vibrant, and has an agency of 
its own. It is not clear how exactly material things can at least partly create meaning and 
have constitutive effects upon humans. Unless we develop appropriate methodological 
tools, there is a danger that New Materialists will fall into the trap of functionalism and 
focus on process tracing a series of material effects and their impacts (Aradau, 2010; 
Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Mitchell, 2014), that they will return to purely 
discursive modes of analysis, or that they will fall prey to the critique that they are 
analyzing without any systematicity personalized impressionistic affects that certain 
kinds of matter leave upon them. Thus Bennett, one of the most cited New Materialist 
scholars in the social sciences, has difficulties specifying her methodology. By her own 
account she has “tried to learn to induce an attentiveness to things and their affects from 
Thoreau, Franz Kafka and Whitman…” (Bennett, 2010: xiv) with the result that “stuff 
exhibited its thing-power: it issued a call, even if [she] did not quite understand what it 
was saying. At the very least, it provoked affects in [her]” (Bennett, 2010: 4). 
While the difficulties with this kind of personalized impressionistic account are 
apparent, discourse analytical approaches also do not provide an adequate framework to 
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 I define ideas as the intersubjectively shared interpretations and understandings of social reality rather 
than as individually held causal beliefs, as neoliberal institutionalists tend to do (Goldstein and Keohane, 
1993). 
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fully tease out the material dimension of meaning making. In a discourse analysis 
approach, signifiers do not relate to the signified, but rather to other signifiers. 
Intertextual relations are more important than a connection to objects in the material 
world (Doty, 1993). The goal is to identify how language constitutes and produces power. 
Because language creates meaning, it directs the possiblities for action (Hall, 2003; 
Milliken, 1999). In this sense discourses have real material effects: “The words that [high 
level officials] write and speak do have extraordinary power. With the stroke of a pen, 
people can get turned into friends or enemies, while their villages are turned into targets 
or free fire zones” (Milliken and Sylvan, 1996: 323).  
Speech act theory shares with discourse analysis the idea that language can result in 
real material effects, because we can act through verbal utterances (Searle, 1995). The 
speech act itself is an event, a material occurrence whose force depends to some extent on 
the place from which it emanates, and on the institutional backing it receives (Waever, 
1995). Foucault (2010) shares this perspective in his Archaeology of Knowledge.3 So 
there are material elements in different branches of discourse analytical scholarship. 
However, while discourse analysis has developed a sophisticated toolbox to study 
discourses—predicate analysis, binary oppositions, and metaphorical analysis—it does 
not provide systematic guidelines for studying the material side of the equation or 
interrelating the material and the ideational.  
Perhaps for this reason some authors suggest that even the material world can be read 
like a discourse, or a text. In IR scholarship Neumann (2008: 75-76), for example, 
develops a discourse analysis toolkit, suggesting, “tool two would be an equalizer that 
makes other phenomena (for example, a semaphore, an ad, a body) into material to be 
analyzed on a par with texts. Tool three would be something like a herding dog that 
would group these phenomena together based on them being about the same thing. Tool 
four would be a slicer, cutting the phenomena into different representations of the same 
thing. Tool five would be some kind of optic device that would make visible the meaning 
dimension of the material phenomenon to its users.” Yet, employing the same discursive 
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 Foucault’s understanding of the relation between the discursive and the material is very complex, and 
subject to sustained debates, whose elaboration would reach beyond the scope of this paper (Hekman, 
2009; Kelly, 2009). It appears clearly,though that, for Foucault a non-discursive reality exists, and interacts 
in complex ways with discourses (see, for example, Foucault, 2010: 175, 186). In some of his writings 
Foucault even appears to adopt a Peircean semeiotic approach (Foucault, 1983).  
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tools used for the analysis of language to analyze material objects means that the sign an 
object represents is unrelated to the materiality of that object, just as a word like dog is 
arbitrarily attributed to the barking being with four legs and a wagging tail. The problem 
with analyzing material objects as words incorporated in a discourse is that we lose their 
materiality, the functional effects they can have, the bodily perception, and the 
component of pre-discursive practical knowledge that is attached to them. Thus, while 
material objects do form a code that has to be decoded in order to understand the meaning 
of objects and their constitutive effects, merely extending the linguistic model to all 
forms of signification is insufficient. 
On the other end of the spectrum, scholars focusing on the material side of reality 
have automatically assumed an unequivocal link between material reality and what that 
reality signifies or how it is being signified (Chase-Dunn, 1979; King et al., 1994; Pape, 
2003).4 Under these circumstances the goal of research is to identify generalizable causal 
connections between dependent and independent variables with the help of either large-N 
studies, case studies, or both in the form of mixed methods approaches. With such 
premises, context-dependent meaning cannot be taken into account — only the functional 
dimension of material reality is being considered. More recently, it has become common 
for scholars to add an ideational component as an additional independent variable to the 
analysis (Nelson, 2014; Nye, 1990). However, such approaches analyse an ideational 
dimension next to material elements without considering the profound interconnectivity 
between the two. Quite frequently these approaches treat the ideational dimension in the 
same way they treat the material components in their analysis. That is, they focus purely 
on its causal and functional effects, as if ideas were another, independent, element of 
material reality, merely one that cannot be touched or seen.   
In order to eliminate the difficulties linguistic and materialist approaches each face in 
isolation, many scholars mix several methods to study the combined effects of material 
and ideational phenomena and highlight the cumulative effects of symbolic and 
functional forces (Checkel 2005; Sil and Katzenstein 2010). For example, Pouliot (2007) 
has coined the term “sobjectivism” to express the combination of a “recovery of 
subjective meanings,” with the help of such methods as ethnography and qualitative 
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 The literature is too prolific to list it all; the references cited serve merely as a few illustrations. 
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interviews, and their intersubjective contextualization through discourse analysis. He sees 
discourses as “productive of the social realities they define” (Pouliot, 2007: 371) and 
establishes a dialectical relationship between reality and discourse, in the sense that 
“discursive intersubjective structures falter unless constantly instantiated and 
reinstantiated through agents’ practices.” Pouliot’s work effectively demonstrates the 
interplay between materiality and discourses. But, as with other mixed methods 
approaches, it does not fully address the question of how we can systematically study the 
meaning generated by practices and things which directly emerges from them and exists 
beyond their discursive interpretation.  
Peircean semeiotics is one possible way to systematically study practices and things 
as material signs that partly incorporate discursive elements in them, but that can also 
communicate meaning non-discursively. Perhaps the main advantage of a Peircean 
semeiotic approach is that it provides a clearly structured framework to study the 
interpenetrated nature of the material and the ideational. While a few scholars in other 
disciplines, such as anthropology, archaeology, tourism studies, or communication 
studies have used a Peircean semeiotic approach (Lele, 2006; Metro-Roland, 2009; Mick, 
1986), to my knowledge in IR only Kangas (2009) has used Peircean semeiotics, in her 
study of popular culture as interpretants of International Relations. The present paper 
adds to Kangas’s work by extending its reach, and suggests that a Peircean semeiotic 
approach can provide a useful analytical framework for the New Materialisms emerging 
in IR scholarship. 
  
3 Peirce’s semeiotics 
Before delving into an in-depth analysis of Peirce’s semeiotics, I will first provide a brief 
overview of his basic semeiotic apparatus. This sketch can serve the reader as a roadmap 
to which she can return for orientation when getting lost in the argument: Peirce’s 
semeiotics is based on tripartite divisions, the most fundamental of which is his tripartite 
division between an object; a sign, which represents the object; and an interpretant, which 
is the potential for interpretation resulting from the sign. A sign represents an object 
thanks to a ground, which is the relation that links the sign to the object. Depending on 
that relation we classify signs into icons (representing based on similarity), indices 
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(representing based on a causal or contiguous relationship) and symbols (representing 
based on a social convention). It is noteworthy that the arrow between object and sign 
runs in both directions because at times the object leads to the creation of the sign, while 
at other times the sign creates its object. Lastly, the sign brings about a particular 
interpretant, which is the possibility for interpretation. The interpretant can be classified 
into three possible forms of interpretation: emotional (resulting in feelings), energetic 
(resulting in action), and logical (resulting in thoughts). The graph below provides an 
overview of these tripartite divisions and the following sections will analyze them in 
more depth.  
 
 
 
3.1 Peirce’s ontology: a rejection of the dualism between the material 
and the ideational 
Like the New Materialisms, Peirce’s semeiotics is based on an understanding of the 
continuity between mind and nature. The effects of our thoughts are displayed in the 
environment so that we cannot discern a clear boundary between the two (Short, 2007: 9). 
Clark (1997) notes similarly that we tend to externalize our mind onto the world. For 
example, we use a pen and a piece of paper to make complicated calculations, or when 
we write on a computer we move chunks of text around on the screen to organize our 
thoughts. Our thought processes are not purely ideational, but inextricably linked to the 
manipulation of material objects, and by consequence those objects structure our thought 
processes. 
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According to Peirce “it is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in 
any copy of his book than they are in his brain” (Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 6: 364).5 A 
book is neither purely material nor purely ideational, but rather a combination of the two, 
even though an excessive focus on “symbols, which signify via arbitrary convention, has 
led [scholars] to treat ‘material qualities’ of a sign, such as a word’s letters, as entirely 
irrelevant to its signification” (Legg, 2008: 225). In contrast, Peirce focused on the 
“concrete instances where the specific material quality of a sign enables it to function as 
the precise kind of sign it is, thus in turn enabling the precise kind of reasoning it makes 
possible” (Skagestad, 2004: 251/ 252).  
For example, perspectival painting operated as a sign system that permitted 
Renaissance artists to identify new geometrical regularities that then contributed to the 
development of modern mapping techniques with which the territorial state could be 
represented (Branch, 2011; Edgerton, 1975). The vanishing point is the central element 
that orders the proportionality of all the other elements in the painting into a singular, 
unified, and abstract space with the help of a grid system. The exact location of the 
elements in the painting, their spatial relations to each other, and the distances between 
them all become discernible to the viewer. Perspectival painting allowed for the 
development of projective geometry. Out of a fascination for linear perspective, artists 
started to draw city views from an oblique elevation, as bird’s-eye views. Initially these 
oblique positions were actually existing views of the city, for example from a hill. Once 
the city-view became an imagined view, such as in da Vinci’s drawing of Milan, it was 
necessary to perform “an abstraction based on the principles of mathematical perspective 
in an effort to preserve accuracy” (Rees, 1980: 69). From here it was only a small step to 
draw a city-view from an entirely vertical perspective. Because such a vertical view from 
directly above the city did not exist at the time, painters had to extrapolate it with the help 
of similar geometrical calculations and methods of triangulation as the ones used for the 
imaginary oblique perspective (Smith, 2008). But a city view drawn from a position 
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 This differs from, for example, Bourdieu (1990) and Searle (1995), who conceive of the habitus and the 
background as the aggregate of individuals’ dispositions and beliefs. Peirce and Popper share the 
perspective that ideas exist objectively, beyond the individuals’ minds. They disagree, however, in that for 
Popper (1978) thoughts are located in a World 3 that is causally linked to the World 1 of material objects, 
whereas for Peirce the material objects are inseparable from the thoughts they contain (Haack, 1977). I 
thank Emanuel Adler for clarifying this point. 
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vertically above the city and in line with the rules of linear perspective is nothing other 
than a modern map. To depict territorial states it was merely necessary to extend the 
scope of the map. Projective geometry then allowed establishing an indexical connection 
between the map and the terrain, and by virtue of this indexical connection the map could 
resemble the terrain, it could function as an icon of the territory.  
 
3.2 Towards a method of Peircean semeiotics  
Peirce’s semeiotics permit us to decodify material and linguistic signs. We can trace how 
the combined effects of Peirce’s tripartite division of signs into icons, indices, and 
symbols establish a rich sign system with a variety of communicational patterns.6 These 
in turn result in emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants that subsequently alter the 
reality that will enter the sign system.7   
The first step of this method is to search for signs that represent the objects that 
interest us by gathering qualitative data to serve as the raw material for the analysis. Any 
of the existing methods of data gathering can be useful, including participant observation, 
qualitative interviews, archival research, site-visits, museum and exhibition visits, or 
secondary literature researches (Bueger, 2014; Yanow, 2000).  
The next step is to identify the grounds upon which the collected signs represent their 
objects. The ground is the relationship that connects the sign to the object; it is the reason 
that a sign represents a given object. In other words, not every characteristic of the sign is 
important for establishing its representativeness. For example, a color-filled map of a 
country represents that country’s territory because it resembles the country’s shape and is 
causally connected to its geography by surveying techniques. But the concrete color used 
for filling the map is irrelevant. Furthermore, different signs can represent the same 
object, in each case focusing on a different ground (Short, 2007). Thus while a map is 
simultaneously indexically and iconically linked to the country, a flag represents a 
country by social convention. Peirce classified signs into icons, indices, and symbols 
based on the ground that connects the sign to its object. This tripartite differentiation 
                                                        
6
 Peirce distinguished between up to 66 categories of signs (for more detail see Liszka, 1996 or Short, 
2007). However, the distinction between icon, index, and symbol is generally considered the most 
significant of Peirce’s classifications (Hookway, 1985; Liszka, 1996) and it is the most pertinent for our 
analysis.  
7
 Peirce’s semeiotics can lead to a myriad of other methods (Liszka, 1996; Skagestad, 2004).  
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provides the researcher with a vocabulary that directs her attention to the different 
relations by which signs can signify a particular meaning.  
 
3.2.1 The index 
It is probably easiest to first identify the indexical relations between signs and their 
objects because the index establishes a direct physical connection to its object 
(Skagestad, 2004) that exists independently of social convention (Atkin, 2005). The 
indexicality of speech, for instance, ties spoken words to the person of the speaker and 
her position – a tool, which can be useful for speech act theorists.  
Index and object can be physically connected in two different ways. First, the object 
and the index can be connected on the basis of spatial and temporal proximity (Goudge, 
1965; Liszka, 1996: 38). The index can draw our attention to a particular object. Arrows 
are typical examples of indices. Yet we can broaden the notion of the index much further. 
The index can include memorial plaques, which highlight that a particular event occurred 
in a certain location. Perhaps even more politically salient, many religious sites derive 
their significance from being the location of a particular event, from containing holy 
relics, and/or from being the site of daily practices of worship. There is often a material 
and irreplaceable relation that ties the religious site to specific events or things, even 
though it is not a functional relation. How those ties are then interpreted, and which kinds 
of emotional reactions, thoughts, or actions they evoke, will be different for different 
people (Hassner, 2003). Without a Peircean semeiotic approach it can be hard to discern 
how sacred space can contain a material dimension of sacredness (which is its 
indexicality tied to the occurrence of a particular event, the positioning of relics, etc.), 
while simultaneously being subjectively sacred, i.e. how that indexicality is interpreted 
depends on the eyes of the beholder. Goddard (2006), for one, did not grasp the material 
dimension in Hassner’s argument, which led her to claim that her own argument about 
the intersubjective construction of the indivisibility of sacred space is superior to 
Hassner’s claim of subjectively held beliefs of sacredness. Yet, the indexicality of sacred 
space means that there are hard limits to socially constructing sacredness, which is 
important for understanding the intractability of many conflicts over religious sites, as 
well as the search for possible solutions to those conflicts. Acknowledging this indexical 
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dimension has the advantage of taking religion seriously and not entirely reducing it to a 
social construction (Gregory, 2006).  
Next to a connection based on spatial and temporal proximity, a causal relationship 
can exist between an index and its object. This can be based on the need for financial 
resources to obtain a particular sign or because of a functional link that connects the sign 
to its object. Much of the newly emerging status literature focuses on this dimension. For 
instance, China’s aircraft carriers represent China’s increasing economic wealth and 
development: aircraft carriers are very expensive and require high levels of technological 
and organizational skill to operate (Pu and Schweller, 2014). It is not surprising that there 
is a correlation between the acquisition of aircraft carriers and the availability of 
economic resources: “China is not a unique case as there is always a clear correlation 
between economic resources and the strength of naval power” (Pu and Schweller, 2014: 
156). The indexical relation here merely indicates that a state has the necessary resources 
to be able to afford aircraft carriers; it does not tell us anything about how others interpret 
this acquisition, whether as an unnecessary wastage, a threat, or an awe-inspiring move. 
Quantitative research makes use of the index when employing ‘proxies’ as 
measurable variables that are causally related to potentially immeasurable phenomena. 
For example, number of battle deaths is frequently used as an indicator for the intensity 
of a war, or income can serve as a proxy for social class (Bryman and Cramer, 2009). It is 
of course not possible to simply assume the validity of proxies. Researchers need to 
clarify “the extent to which a measure assesses the construct that it is intended or 
supposed to measure” (Cramer and Howitt, 2004: 36). Even so, proxies can be extremely 
useful indicators in a large variety of different fields. For clarification, it is worth noting 
that the causal relationship inherent in the index differs from the positivist understanding 
of causality: the indexical causality is merely a causality between an object and its sign. It 
does not necessarily establish causality between a dependent and an independent variable 
as two phenomena of a real and unmediated world. 
  We can often identify the existence of an indexical relation between an object and 
a sign in language usage with the help of the rhetorical device of metonymy. Metonymy 
is a common linguistic practice that signifies the use of “one entity to refer to another that 
is related to it” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 35). “Metonymic concepts are grounded in 
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our experience. In fact, the grounding of metonymic concepts is in general more obvious 
than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves direct physical or 
causal associations” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 39). Lakoff and Johnson provide 
numerous examples of daily usage of metonymy, such as “Wall Street is in a panic” or 
“the White House isn’t saying anything” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 35-38). We can 
identify from these phrases that there is a direct association of physical proximity 
between Wall Street and the New York stock exchange, as well as between the US 
presidency and the White House. 
 
3.2.2 The icon 
Because the indexical relationship merely establishes a material connection between a 
sign and its object, it is subsequently necessary to deduce specific characteristics of the 
object from the sign at hand. One way of doing this is to identify an iconic relationship 
between a sign and an object (which can at times also exist independently of an indexical 
relationship). An icon represents an object because of a similarity in a particular 
characteristic shared by both sign and object. The resemblance that relates an icon to its 
object can be sensory—for example, a pictorial resemblance. The portrait of a king is an 
icon in the sense that it resembles the king. But Peirce also considered music an icon 
because it incarnates musical feelings, which are its object (Short, 1996).  
Furthermore, the relationship between icon and object can be a structural 
resemblance, in which case “[the icon’s] parts should be related in the same way that the 
objects represented by those parts are themselves related” (Legg, 2008: 207). Analogies 
are a typical example, because they establish a relational resemblance where the relation 
between A and B is the same as the relation between C and D (Liszka, 1996). Diagrams 
are another category of icons that represent through structural resemblance; a typical 
example is a graph representing economic growth in a given country.  
Icons as means of signification can be found outside of language and cognition; 
Peirce considered icons typical for the fine arts (Short, 2007), where they can lead in 
particular to emotional interpretants, that is, they evoke feelings rather than thoughts. It 
then becomes apparent that iconic representation can be material on two accounts. On the 
one hand the sign, the icon itself, can be material – an artifact, a practice, or a natural 
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occurrence – but the icon can also be a linguistic expression, metaphors being a case in 
point. On the other hand the icon is material in the sense that in its pure form the icon 
represents its object solely on the basis of similarity. Hence the object can be inferred 
from the icon through unmediated phenomenological perception, directly by the senses 
and through the body, without the need for intersubjectively shared rules (Kolenda, 
1977). The pure icon is a non-arbitrary sign, although we will see that few signs exist in 
this pure form.    
 
3.2.3 The symbol 
To determine a symbolic connection between a sign and its object, we have to identify 
the intersubjectively shared understanding that underlies a symbol’s signification. The 
symbol represents a particular object only because there is shared background knowledge 
that it does so. Symbols have the same characteristics as all signs in the conventional 
linguistic understanding of sign systems. It is therefore useful to apply the usual discourse 
analytical tools to the study of symbols (Doty, 1993; Hansen, 2006; Milliken, 1999). 
Most, but not all, words are typical examples of symbols, but cultural artifacts or 
practices can equally be of a symbolic nature (Liszka, 1996). For instance, some scholars 
in a growing IR literature on forms of popular culture analyze movies, board games, or 
computer games with the help of discourse analytical tools. Thus Weldes edited a volume 
in which the authors “view [Science Fiction] as a generic discourse or system of 
meaning-producing codes” (Weldes, 2003: 13).  
 
3.2.4 Complex signs: combinations of icons, indices, and symbols  
The three categories of signs – icon, index, and symbol – are irreducible to each other; 
each fulfills a distinct function in semeiosis, which cannot operate if any one of them is 
missing. At the same time it is very hard to find a sign that is a pure icon, index, or 
symbol. It is rather common to find complex signs incorporating a mix of these three 
categories (Atkin, 2005; Hookway, 1985; Legg, 2008). Typical examples of signs that 
combine iconic and indexical components are biometrics, such as fingerprints that are 
increasingly used in modern border control technologies (Scheel, 2013). Fingerprints are 
indexically tied to a particular person through the process of taking fingerprints, and they 
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iconically represent the imprint of a person’s finger. Demonstrative pronouns are 
combinations of symbols and indexes because they are different in each language, and at 
the same time they incorporate an unmediated relationship to an object marked by spatial 
and temporal proximity (Atkin, 2005; Savan, 1987). Lastly, metaphors are an example of 
signs composed of symbolic and iconic components. On the one hand they rely on 
language, which is largely of a symbolic nature, on the other hand they are based on 
similarities, on pictorial imaginations, which often seek to express otherwise 
inexpressible emotional states. Disentangling signs according to the different grounds 
based on which they represent an object can help researchers to identify the functional 
and symbolic connections between signs and their objects.  
The combined effects of icon and index permit signs to simultaneously refer to an 
object, which is the indexical part, and characterize that object, which is the iconic part 
(Liszka, 1996). In Peirce’s understanding the arbitrary connection between symbol and 
object can hinge on the non-arbitrary functions of index and icon (Sorrell, 2004). Over 
time the connection between index and object can grow into general conventions and 
rules (Short, 2004). Thus we might be able to establish a temporal sequence during which 
the sign changes its function from index to icon to symbol (Goudge, 1965; Legg, 2008; 
Short, 2007: 227). Process-tracing such temporal progressions of changing forms of 
signification can be a powerful tool to understand how certain social conventions develop 
or how some symbolic significations emerge. 
A brief sketch of the historical development of money can serve as an illustration. 
Money is a popular constructivist example for explaining intersubjectively shared norms 
(see for example Adler, 1997; Searle, 1995). According to the conventional constructivist 
understanding money can only function as a medium of exchange if it is accepted and 
recognized as such within a given community. Constructivists highlight the symbolic 
nature of money when they rightly claim that whales’ teeth are unlikely to be accepted as 
a medium of payment in a North American supermarket, even though they might still be 
accepted on the Fijian islands.  
While I do not want to deny the symbolic nature of money, a more historical 
perspective suggests that indexical and iconic features played a crucial role in the 
emergence of particular forms of money. Contra linguistic-turn approaches, the 
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materiality of money shaped the meaning it evoked and the uses it served. Especially in 
its earlier stages of development, money had to fulfill certain material and functional 
characteristics — specifically, the objects serving as money had to be transportable, 
relatively rare, quite hard to counterfeit, and easily divisible. Precious metals were one 
type of material that fulfilled these criteria. A cursory glance at monetary development in 
Western Europe demonstrates that during the Middle Ages the nominal value of a coin 
was initially equivalent to the value of the metal out of which the coin was made. An 
indexical and an iconic relationship existed between a coin’s nominal and intrinsic 
metallic value. But over time, in order to overcome budgetary difficulties, the princes 
who had the right to coinage began to debase the currency. So-called “token money” 
emerged. The nominal value exceeded its metallic content, although the coins looked the 
same. The indexical relation between the coin and its value disappeared, whereas the 
iconic relation remained intact. Although this maneuver was initially considered fraud, in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries economists started to suggest that it was 
necessary to have token money in circulation for the smooth functioning of the economy, 
as long as the supply of coins did not exceed the demand for transactions (Cipolla, 1956). 
Thus, a social convention emerged, and a symbolic character was added to the relation 
between coins and their value. Towards the end of the 17th century banknotes came into 
circulation (Braudel, 1979: vol. I, 414-418). By then the relationship between money and 
its value ceased to be an iconic one, and became a symbolic relation based on a shared 
rule of accepting those pieces of paper as money.  
We can identify a very similar temporal progression of changing forms of 
signification in an entirely different case, namely the establishment of the principle of 
sovereign equality on the basis of diplomatic forms of representation. The precondition 
for this development was the emergence of a clear indexical relation that tied a diplomat 
to his sovereign (instead of having a diplomat serve numerous sovereigns 
simultaneously), which emerged by the end of the 17th century and was materially 
manifested in the diplomat’s wage, his letters of credence, and his diplomatic instructions 
(Queller, 1967). By virtue of the indexical relationship between the diplomat and his 
sovereign, the diplomat could also operate as an icon that represented the sovereign 
through a relationship of structural similarity. Perhaps the most immediate indicator of 
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the rank of a particular sovereign in the European hierarchy was the embodied practices 
of diplomatic precedence, in particular the spatial positioning of diplomats at social 
occasions. Where a diplomat was located in a procession indicated the social rank of his 
sovereign. As a result disputes over precedence were very common. In order to avoid 
these disputes rulers increasingly resorted to diplomatic practices that would express the 
equal standing between rulers, such as entering a room simultaneously on the sound of a 
horn (Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011). Over time the social convention of sovereign 
equality could emerge out of these iconic diplomatic practices. At the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815 rulers agreed that diplomatic precedence seized to play its iconic role. The norm 
emerged that among equally ranked diplomats the person who is on her post for the 
longer time period takes precedence (Wight, 1977). The new diplomatic practices 
symbolized sovereign equality by virtue of the agreed social norm; they did not represent 
it any longer iconically.  
 
3.2.5 The interpretant 
The last step of the analysis is to identify the interpretant. The interpretant is the potential 
for interpretation or misinterpretation that is inherent in a sign (Skagestad, 2004; Sorrell, 
2004), even if that potential does not always become an actuality, or does not always 
become an actuality in the same way. In Peirce’s understanding signs are usually 
interpreted in relation to other signs (Gottdiener, 1995). The context of a given situation 
matters for completing the meaning of a sign, as do the historical experiences and 
knowledge of the interpreter, “the collateral information” (Metro-Roland, 2009: 274). 
Depending on context, a sign can stand for different interpretants (Short, 2007). Thus the 
palace of Versailles with its adjacent gardens evoked a sense of glory and prestige in 
Louis XIV, while it provoked a fear of supremacy in other rulers, which led them into a 
balancing alliance against the Sun King (Mukerji, 1997).8  
The researcher’s task is to trace the connections between sign and interpretant and 
identify how particular components of a sign, given a specific context and collateral 
information, lead the actors to feel (emotional interpretant), act (energetic interpretant), or 
                                                        
8
 The fact that a sign can lead to different interpretants does not negate the possibility of a causal and 
material connection between the sign and its object. 
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think (logical interpretant) in certain ways. A first approach can be to draw “on the 
researcher-analyst’s participative experiences as proxy for others’ behaviors and actions: 
Through those firsthand, immediate experiences the analyst gains entry into 
understanding others’ responses” (Yanow, 2000: 64). Nonetheless, these experiences of 
the self should be further backed up with interviews or documentary analysis in order to 
identify other people’s responses to a particular sign in a given context and relate those to 
their historical experiences and knowledge (Yanow, 2000).   
Peircean semeiotics provides one way to highlight the profound interconnectivity of 
the material and the ideational. At the same time, other methodological approaches have 
different advantages and it is possible to combine Peircean semeiotics with other tools. 
One typical example would be to combine Peircean semeiotics with discourse analysis. 
One could also combine Peircean semeiotics with abduction – the process whereby we 
intelligently guess the most likely explanation for a particular phenomenon, usually by 
moving back and forth between theory and empirics (Hookway, 1985: 224; Peirce, 1931-
1935, Vol. 6: 530). Peirce would not have considered his semeiotics incompatible with 
abduction, a concept he himself invented. One of several ways that he related abduction 
and semeiotics was to suggest that the semeiotic apparatus permits the analysis of signs 
that provide the empirical material from which abduction can develop.  
 
4 GDP as a complex sign 
Scholars whose work falls under the old materialism, be it quantitative or qualitative, 
often simply assume that GDP is an indexical sign that provides an accurate measure of 
the size of the economy (see for example Maersheimer, 2010; Beaulieu et al., 2012; 
Büthe et al., 2012; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000-1). Yet, significant changes in GDP can 
be statistical artifacts, unrelated to any underlying changes in the economy. Thus a 
change in the way in which businesses’ Research and Development is accounted for has 
led to upward revisions of GDP of up to 14% (Coyle, 2014).9 Similarly, Italy’s decision 
in 1987 to include the informal economy in its calculations of GDP resulted in an 
                                                        
9
 Prior to 2008 businesses’ Research and Development appeared in national accounts as an intermediate 
good, which was necessary for the production of a final product, and hence businesses’ R&D did not lead 
to an increase in GDP. Since 2008 businesses’ R&D is considered an investment and therefore increases 
GDP. 
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approximately 20% increase of GDP, and made Italy the fifth largest economy in the 
world at the time, surpassing the United Kingdom. Italians called the event il sorpasso, 
the overtaking (Coyle, 2014: 106).  
On the interpretivist side scholars study statistics such as GDP as a form of 
rhetoric, as “figures of speech in numerical dress” (McCloskey, 1998: 21). They might 
highlight the constitutive nature of GDP, the ways in which it constructs the economy, 
and how it shapes the policy priorities elites adopt (Suzuki, 2003). Thus Waring (1989) 
notes how GDP systematically underrepresents work done by women, and therefore 
constitutes their work as unproductive. Policy options that would improve the working 
lives of women are consequently neglected. Other interpretivist scholars might 
demonstrate how GDP gains its meaning through its embeddedness in discursive 
formations and in relation to other concepts (for a similar analysis for accounting see 
Arrington and Francis, 1989).  
Yet, while GDP certainly does have this kind of productive power, neglecting that 
GDP has significant indexical elements which provide a direct connection of the sign to 
material reality would lead us to omit another source of power that emanates from GDP. 
By virtue of the indexical connection GDP is an important technology with the help of 
which governments can exert control.10 Thus Kuznets and Nathan used national 
accounting techniques (which form the basis for the calculation of GDP) to advise 
Roosevelt on the feasibility of munitions programs. They suggested revisions to set 
targets (Carson, 1975; Fogel et al., 2013) and helped expand the proportion of GNP 
dedicated to war production from an initial 4% in 1941 to 48% in 1944 (Perlman and 
Marietta, 2005). According to another account, Nazi Germany’s excellent use of national 
accounting techniques provided it with a superior control over its economy. It could 
identify underutilized resources, and integrate them into the planning efforts. National 
accounting techniques thus formed one of the bases of Nazi German power (Aly and 
Roth, 1984). The indexical connection of GDP to the economy allows exerting a certain 
control over the economy from a distance, which is necessary for government to operate 
on a given territory (Latour, 1990). Conversely, when the numbers are inaccurate, as is 
                                                        
10
 Foucault’s (2007) concept of governmentality depends on the knowledge of territory and population 
generated through such indexical connections, as for example between the economy and GDP. 
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the case in many African countries, governing becomes a lot more difficult (Jerven, 
2013).  
GDP operates as an inscription device (Latour, 1990). Inscriptions are “the 
material and graphical representations” (Robson, 1992: 685), “the various techniques of 
‘marking’ an object or event that is to be known – writing, recording, drawing, 
tabulating” (Robson, 1992: 689). Like other inscription devices, such as maps, diagrams 
or statistics, GDP inscribes reality on paper or on hard disks. However, inscription 
devices “are not techniques of representation that simply extract information from 
externally given worlds while leaving the worlds they represent untouched. The device of 
extraction enacts worlds in the sense that it is an active force that is part of a process of 
continuous production and reproduction of relations, an endless process of bringing 
worlds into being” (Aradau and Huysmans, 2014: 603). Inscription devices not only enact 
objects, but are also tools to be acted upon.  
In the following I will demonstrate using the example of GDP how a Peircean 
semeiotic apparatus can analyze material signs, such as inscription devices, as complex 
signs which often integrate symbolic, indexical, and iconic features in them. In addition, 
emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants help us understand the effects material 
signs have on the world in interaction with humans.  
 
4.1 GDP’s indexical features 
The emergence of money, accounting, and numeration have been historically linked 
(Latour 1990; Robson, 1992; Roover, 1963; Schmandt-Besserat, 1984). Scholars have 
argued that commerce and monetary exchange were at the origin of index numbers in 
general (Klein 1997: 76). The exchange that occurs on markets in monetary terms allows 
accountants to observe the monetary, and therefore numerical, values that are attributed 
to the goods traded on markets. Accountants can thus aggregate the monetary values of a 
large number of items, which otherwise do not share any other characteristic in common. 
“A fundamental merit of market transactions is that they provide ‘objective’ prices that 
serve to value quantities of goods and services” (Stiglitz et al., 2009: 86). 
The concrete ways in which national accountants observe the monetary values of 
traded items, that then become aggregated to a GDP figure, include tax returns, import 
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and export documents, the public accounts of the government and the institutions it 
finances, “published financial accounts of private enterprises such as listed public 
companies, producer boards, and nonprofit organizations” (Waring, 1989: 116), data 
gathered in connection with other governmental regulatory activities, data collected by 
trade bodies, large-scale censuses, periodical questionnaires, and sample surveys (Fogel 
et al., 2013). One specific method developed by Wassily Leontief, namely input-output 
tables, traces the movement of intermediate goods through the economy to compute the 
value added in production (Coyle, 2014). The sum of all the values added in the economy 
gives us the GDP measured from the production side of the economy.  
 
4.2 GDP’s symbolic features 
Despite the clear indexical connection between GDP and the economy, many symbolic 
features enter into the calculation of GDP. GDP is an aggregate indicator, and therefore 
depends on categorizations which regulate what is included within its purview and what 
is excluded. “Distinct normative purposes determine what is to be measured” (Perlman 
and Marietta, 2005: 227),11 but at the same time it is necessary to take into account what 
can be measured. In the case of GDP, there is a connection between the socially agreed 
upon rules about which items are included in the measurement of GDP, and the 
possibility of directly observing the monetary values of those items. That is to say, there 
is some connection between the symbolic and the indexical features of GDP. GDP is 
mainly, but not exclusively, a measure of market production (Stiglitz et al., 2009). It 
requires the Peircean semeiotic apparatus to be able to identify this connection between 
the symbolic and the indexical dimension. A discourse analytical approach cannot 
account for the fact that certain components are excluded from GDP because they lack 
the indexicality that would allow to attribute a numerical value to a certain object, as 
discourse analysis does not consider the possibility of a direct link between a signifier 
and a signified. Old materialists, in turn, do not consider the role of socially agreed 
                                                        
11
 Historically different understandings existed as to what should be included in the calculation of national 
income. Thus Adam Smith thought that services should not form a part of income accounting, because they 
redistributed resources to the unproductive classes. Communist countries later adopted a similar perspective 
(Coyle, 2014). Alternatively, the physiocrats, with Quesnay in the lead, thought that only agricultural 
production should be counted towards income (Kendrick, 1970). 
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conventions that play a role for including certain components in the calculation of GDP 
while excluding others.  
When items are not exchanged on the market, it is impossible to observe their 
monetary value and identify a recorded exchange (Anderson, 1991). We have to work 
with imputed values, which are highly assumption driven data—data, which are based on 
social conventions and theoretical commitments, and therefore of a symbolic nature. In 
such cases the indexical link to the real economy is very dubious; the data become less 
reliable (Stiglitz et al., 2009). Yet, some items are included in GDP calculations although 
they are not recorded market exchanges, among them measures for the home production 
of goods, imputed rents of homeowners, or the shadow economy. Other items, such as 
leisure, or the home production of services like cooking, cleaning, and raising children, 
have not been included in GDP (Waring, 1989). Given that the amount of time dedicated 
to these tasks varies among countries, an inclusion of such measures would affect 
comparisons between countries. For example, it is estimated that the production of 
household services is at the level of 35% of GDP in France, while it is 30% of GDP in the 
US (Stiglitz et al., 2009: 130). An additional inclusion of leisure as a good that people 
enjoy, might add another estimated 80% to GDP (Stiglitz et al., 2009: 90). However, the 
question how to attribute market prices to leisure is quite daunting. The unreliability of 
imputed data also haunts alternative aggregate economic indicators, such as Net 
Domestic Product (which accounts for the depreciation of capital goods), or 
environmentally adjusted GDP. These alternative indicators place a higher premium on 
sustainability, but national accountants resist their implementation, because they rely so 
heavily on imputed data. 
 Also the ways in which GDP is calculated depend significantly on social norms. 
Many of the rules according to which GDP is computed are derived from economic 
theory. In particular Keynesianism was at the origin of GDP’s invention in the 1940s. 
Following Keynesian theory, fundamental identities underlie the calculation of GDP. For 
example, if we want to calculate GDP from the demand side of the economy, we have to 
follow the equation Y=C+I+G+(X-M), that is income = consumption + investment + 
government expenditure + (exports - imports). Economists contested these identities in 
the 1940s (Suzuki, 2003). For instance, while Kuznets wanted to subtract government 
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spending from GDP rather than add it to it, Roosevelt was interested in accounting for 
government spending as an addition to GDP, because he did not wish for the war effort to 
result in an ostensible reduction of output (Carson, 1975; Coyle, 2014).  
Following another underlying assumption for the measurement of GDP, we can 
calculate GDP in one of three ways: by adding all the incomes in the economy, all the 
expenditures, or all the output. In line with equilibrium theory and the technique of 
double entry bookkeeping, these three methods have to yield the same results. By 
definition the income side has to match the expense side. These theoretical commitments 
were so strong that Stone, one of the leading economists in the implementation of the UN 
System of National Accounts, remarked “it has always seemed to me that in national 
income and expenditure work where the true values of the variables must satisfy certain 
definitional equations it would be desirable to adjust the observations actually obtained so 
that these equations were exactly satisfied” (Stone, 3 March 1949a, in: Suzuki, 2003: 
485). So in this case the indexical and the symbolic features of GDP run against each 
other, with the symbolic features gaining the upper hand. 
While GDP measures are occasionally adapted to be in line with theoretical 
commitments, at other times it is impossible to obtain specific components of GDP by 
direct observation and measurement. It can for example be the case that a state lacks the 
capacity to collect all the relevant data, as is the case in many developing countries. 
Under such circumstances mathematical equations that depend on specific assumptions 
and theoretical arguments help to determine the missing numbers. Even Keynes’s 
notations of the calculation of GDP contained such footnotes as “obtained by subtracting” 
(in: Suzuki, 2003: 497). Nowadays many GDP data of developing countries are not based 
on observed measures, but on social conventions about how to calculate specific 
variables. Thus the UN reports GDP data for 47 sub-Saharan countries for the time period 
between 1991 and 2004, even though it obtained measures for less than 50% of these 
observations. In cases of missing data, the World Bank Statistics Manual uses “a method 
for ﬁlling the data gap, which is based on the assumption that the growth of the variable 
from a period of which data exists has been the same as the average growth for those 
other countries in the same regional or income grouping, where data exists for both 
periods” (in: Jerven, 2013: 22). The World Bank transforms social conventions into 
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statistical numbers. GDP’s symbolic features fill the gap left by missing indexical 
features.   
Even in cases with good data availability, national accountants have to rely on 
some theoretical assumptions because it is tricky to observe certain phenomena directly. 
For example, inflation interferes with the stability of GDP numbers (Robson, 1992). In 
order to make GDP data comparable from one time period to another, we want to 
evaluate which portion of the change in GDP is due to a mere increase in prices, and 
which portion of the change is due to changes in the real economy. Unfortunately, 
measuring the GDP deflator with the help of which we can identify inflation is very 
complicated.12 One particularly daunting issue is the question of how to differentiate 
between a product’s price increase that is due to the product’s qualitative improvement, 
and one that is merely the result of inflation. In the United States the Boskin Commission 
focused on this very issue, and created a hedonic price index. The hedonic price index 
estimates how the price of each feature of a product is linked to specific quality 
improvements, such as an increase in the size of the memory of computers. Any residual 
price increase not linked to qualitative improvements is attributed to inflation. However, 
the method is complex, contested, and depends on many social conventions (Stiglitz et 
al., 2009). Even so, the Commission reached the conclusion that not taking into account 
qualitative improvements of products led to an overstatement of the inflation rate by 
1.3% and a corresponding understatement of real GDP growth. The adoption of the 
hedonic price index resulted in increased US GDP and its growth over several years, 
which has been linked to the Silicon Valley boom in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Other countries started to catch up with the US economy once they included similar 
measures in their calculations of GDP (Coyle, 2014: 88-90). The episode highlights the 
importance of social conventions, but these conventions evolve around efforts to establish 
the appropriate indexicality of GDP as a sign of the economy. Available methodological 
approaches are unable to capture this complex interplay between symbolism on the one 
hand and indexicality on the other. 
 
4.3 GDP’s iconic features 
                                                        
12
 Making GDP comparable across countries is even more complicated (Coyle, 2014). 
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The economy and economic growth are either “invisible to the naked eye” 
(Latour, 1990: 42), or so complex and confusing that they cannot be deciphered without 
signs. Only after a lengthy process of extracting data and combining them in various 
ways “can the economy be made visible inside piles of charts and lists. Even this is still 
too confusing, so that redrawing and extracting is necessary to provide a few neat 
diagrams that show the Gross National Product” (Latour, 1990: 38). The figure of GDP 
makes the economy visible; it makes it readable (Speich, 2011). Some would even say it 
brings it into existence (Mitchell, 2002). The specific GDP number represents the 
economy by similitude. This is GDP’s iconic feature.  
The iconic character of GDP as a number is an important, but often overlooked, 
material feature of the sign. Existing methodological approaches lack the tools needed to 
understand the role a sign’s material qualities play in the process of signification. Without 
these material characteristics, we lose important dimensions of signification, equating all 
signs to linguistic signs, or omitting the characteristics of signs all together.  
As a number, GDP portrays certain useful characteristics that go beyond its 
rhetoric purposes. GDP is significantly more mobile than most other forms of signs, be 
they material artifacts, or even words, which can be more easily reinterpreted in different 
contexts. The GDP number is light, but maintains its consistency and can thus easily 
travel across a variety of different settings, through computer systems and networks, 
without being corrupted (Latour, 1990). In addition, the number can be recombined with 
other numbers with the help of mathematical procedures, including multiplications, 
divisions, and additions, as well as statistical methods, such as regression analyses, to 
yield new interesting findings in ways that are precluded to linguistic signs (Hansen and 
Porter, 2012; Robson, 1992). With the help of GDP numbers we can calculate an average 
GDP per capita, ranking countries according to economic performance while their 
diverging characteristics disappear from view behind the unified numerical notation 
(Speich, 2011).  
 The decimal character of the Arabic numerical system helps to perform these 
mathematical functions, which could not be performed so easily if numbers were written 
out in words, or even in the Roman numerical system, given their heterogeneous bases. 
“Computing the sum LXI (61) plus III (3) is manageable without writing, but the point is 
 27 
that the adjacent columnar ordering of these number-symbols is arbitrary because of the 
operation of inconsistent bases. The use of Arabic numerals assists calculation of 
complex sums by allowing columns of numbers to be ordered by their decimal relation. A 
sign for zero supplies a written symbol for what would otherwise be an empty space” 
(Robson, 1992: 696). 
Furthermore, GDP’s representation in quantitative form creates an air of 
objectivity. Despite the many imprecisions and social norms associated with measuring 
GDP, the overwhelming majority of policy makers and scholars treat the sign as if it 
provided a factual measure of the size of the economy. I would suggest that this is due to 
GDP’s numerical notation. Numbers reduce the ambiguity that is typical for qualitative 
statements, as quantification establishes an unequivocal identity (rather than merely a 
similarity) between the objects that are counted towards the aggregate indicator. By 
virtue of being aggregated those objects have to be identical in some regard (Robson, 
1992). In the case of GDP, actually observed product prices, are aggregated with 
assumption driven imputed data and government provided services, the latter of which 
are still measured according to the costs that go into their production rather than 
according to their (non-existent) market value. These differences in data accuracy and 
signification disappear behind a singular GDP number.   
 Additionally, all the doubts and assumptions associated with measuring GDP are 
swept away in their official publication—the material and iconic form in which they 
appear. Instead of publishing GDP numbers as a bandwidth, or adding comments about 
data reliability, GDP has been published as a singular number since its invention in the 
1940s—despite the fact that GDP data has always been subject to revision and 
uncertainty. In one particular instance Keynes remarked “‘you know as well as I do that 
the change in Commonwealth balances (or whatever it was) cannot have been zero last 
year, it must have been several hundred millions; what do you think it was?’ ‘We really 
do not know’, was the reply, ‘but probably between three and four hundred million.’ 
‘Then put it down at £350 million’ said Keynes ‘and try to get some accurate information 
in the future for by your own admission it is very important” (Stone, 21 June 1976b in: 
Suzuki, 2003: 497). The missing indexicality in the data was not noted in their final 
publication. Even today the World Bank does not publish the data it uses to calculate 
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GDP. In response to Jerven’s query about GDP metadata, the World Bank noted that 
“raw data provided by the National Statistics Agencies are not available for external users 
and only a handful of people at the World Bank have access to it” (in Jerven, 2013: 97). 
The absence of qualifying information concerning the reliability of the data increases the 
apparent objectivity of GDP as a measure of the economy. 
 
4.4 GDP’s Interpretants  
Interpretants are the possibilities of interpretation that emerge from a sign. They are the 
effects a sign can have on the emotions, actions, and thoughts of human beings. 
According to Peirce’s tripartite division of object, sign, and interpretant, there can be no 
interpretant without a sign. This means that prior to the invention of GDP in the 1940s, 
GDP could not have influenced leaders’ policy decisions, such as balance of power 
considerations. Thus at the Congress of Vienna, the great powers established a balance of 
power on the continent purely on the basis of population numbers. Although they realized 
that wealthier inhabitants might be bigger assets than poorer inhabitants, they did not 
know how to systematically measure the income of the people (Webster, 1963). Yet, 
materialist scholars who focus on the relation between economic strength and great 
power status routinely make use of reconstructed historical GDP data (such as 
Maddison’s data set which contains GDP figures up to the Roman Empire) to back up 
their claims (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000-2001; Kennedy, 1987; Krasner, 2000; 
Maddison, 2007). The point is not merely that GDP might not be the right measure to 
evaluate economic strength in different historical and geographical contexts (Coyle, 
2014; Speich, 2011), but also that it is unclear how statesmen and diplomats could have 
acted upon a measure which did not yet exist. The fact that GDP is not a purely indexical 
sign, but contains important symbolic elements that are subject to change over time, 
makes matters worse.  
Black (2008) has argued that instead of focusing on GDP to identify great power 
status, scholars should rather rely on what people at the time thought was a great power. 
The present approach certainly agrees with this perspective, but it would add that whom 
statesmen considered a great power at a particular time depended upon the signs that 
portrayed great power status. Thus in the late 17th and the early 18th century, consumption 
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was considered the “foundation of all wealth” (Boisguilbert in Kendrick, 1970: 292), and 
Louis XIV’s lavishly decorated palace of Versailles rose concerns among other rulers, 
who partly for that reason formed a balancing alliance against the Sun King (Mukerji, 
1997). From a Peircean perspective the existence of specific signs is a necessary 
condition for particular interpretants to emerge. Actions, thoughts, and emotions can only 
result from particular objects, if those objects are visible—that is, if they have a sign 
dimension. In the following I highlight some of the interpretants that have resulted from 
GDP as a sign of the economy.    
 
4.4.1 Emotional Interpretants 
Emotional interpretants are the emotions that result from GDP as a sign. It is a 
commonplace that reduced GDP growth signifies an economic downturn and evokes 
fears and anxieties, while high GDP growth arouses euphoria. Beyond a sense that 
individuals’ employment prospects and prosperity depend on the GDP indicator, GDP 
has become a sign of sovereignty for many developing countries, and as such it generates 
a sense of national pride. Like a seat in the United Nations, a national flag, or an anthem, 
the GDP figure is a representation of the state. For most countries high GDP and 
economic growth levels engender strong national self-esteem (Kendrick, 1970). As a 
result, those activities that enhance GDP are highly valued, whereas activities that are not 
included in GDP evoke indifference. Foremost among those are housework and leisure 
(Stiglitz et al., 2009; Waring, 1989). 
 
4.4.2 Energetic Interpretants 
One set of energetic interpretants that results from GDP is due to the fact that GDP has 
served as an input for policy decisions. Policy makers have used GDP figures to reduce 
the effects of recessions with the help of Keynesian demand management. When 
economic growth is low governments can increase public spending in order to increase 
aggregate demand. Or central banks can decrease interest rates to encourage investments. 
Next to influencing government actions, GDP also has effects on the behavior of a whole 
range of other actors. Private investors decide whether a sovereign debt is sustainable 
partly on the basis of debt/GDP ratios, and accordingly buy or sell government bonds. 
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Additionally, GDP measures influence action in international organizations. For example, 
countries with low levels of GDP get access to comparatively inexpensive loans from the 
World Bank. Too high debt/GDP ratios can lead to emergency lending from the 
International Monetary Fund, complete with conditionality measures to ensure 
repayment.  
Next to informing actions, GDP is also often the target of particular activities. 
Governments can decide to support certain undertakings rather than others in order to 
increase GDP. For example, they can encourage mining at the expense of a protection of 
the environment, because environmental degradation does not directly affect GDP, and is 
therefore less visible (Waring, 1989). Similarly, as a result of enhanced productivity 
societies could produce the same amount of goods in less time and thus increase their 
leisure, but usually there tends to be a bias in favor of producing more goods instead, 
perhaps because more leisure time does not increase GDP (Anderson, 1991). For these 
reasons Stiglitz et al. have proposed a range of other indicators to supplement GDP in the 
hope that “the report and its implementation may have a significant impact on the way in 
which our societies looks (sic) at themselves and, therefore, on the way in which policies 
are designed, implemented and assessed” (Stiglitz et al., 2009: 9). 
 
4.4.3 Logical Interpretants 
Logical interpretants are the thoughts that emerge from specific signs. Econometricians 
use GDP figures in their analyses, generating a wide range of theories about business 
cycles and long-term economic development that inform economic thinking. With the 
introduction of GDP and other aggregate economic measures, economics gradually 
transformed into a discipline based on quantitative analyses (Suzuki, 2003); the 
apparently precise nature of GDP as a number might have provided a greater sense of 
scientificity than qualitative indicators. From its origins among the other social science 
disciplines, economics grew from the 1960s ever closer to statistics and acquired a highly 
quantitative focus (Fourcade, 2009; McCloskey, 1998). Quantitative measures like GDP 
extract the economic from its social, political, and natural surroundings when they 
aggregate the purely monetary dimension of particular items and provide a value for the 
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size of the economy. In this sense figures like GDP might have contributed to the 
imagination of a separate economic sphere (Mitchell, 2002). 
In the policy world GDP measures are not only “a basis of calculation for 
management,” but also bare a “significant impact upon government accountability, 
reporting and consensus on matters of the national economy” (Suzuki, 2003: 502). Low 
economic growth is interpreted as government failure, high economic growth affirms 
success. Over time our societies have become used to interpret GDP not merely as a 
measure of economic market production, but rather as a measure of overall well-being. 
The phenomenon is not linked to the sign of GDP itself, but rather emerges from the 
social context in which it is used.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In a context in which the New Materialisms question the Cartesian divide between 
materialism and ideas with such concepts as practices and artefacts, this paper has 
suggested Peirce’s semeiotics as a methodology that permits the systematic and unified 
synthesis of material and ideational components. Based on the epistemological 
foundation that signs always mediate our access to reality, Peirce’s semeiotics 
establishes, by using the concept of the index, a direct, non-arbitrary relationship between 
a sign and its object that is based on representation by contiguity. Yet, the index merely 
indicates the presence of the object. It does not denote any of its qualitative 
characteristics. Icons, which represent by a relationship of similarity, and symbols, which 
represent by social convention, fulfil this purpose within Peirce’s design. This tripartite 
division of signs, and the fact that many signs combine at least two of these categories, 
establishes the interconnectivity between material reality and the ideational realm. 
Furthermore, the tripartite division of interpretants into emotions, actions, and thoughts 
means that the infinite chain of intertextuality can be broken and the process of sign 
interpretation can result in concrete action on the world.  
The paper has demonstrated the potential of Peirce’s semeiotics by analyzing how 
GDP as an inscription device and a complex sign has come to signify the size of a given 
economy. Other fleetingly mentioned examples focused similarly on the material and 
simultaneously ideational constitution of social facts over long periods of time, such as 
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money, the territorial state, or the principle of sovereign equality. Yet, Peircean 
semeiotics can be equally useful for the analysis of more short-term political phenomena, 
like concrete diplomatic negotiations, processes of alliance formation, or the occurrence 
of wars, in that Peircean semeiotics allows us to identify a richer array of communication 
patterns between parties than purely interpretive or old materialist perspectives have 
tended to do. A Peircean semeiotic approach could, for example, integrate signaling 
studies (which focus on signaling costs—an indexical dimension of signs) (Fearon, 1995) 
with linguistic power studies (which focus on symbols) (Bially Mattern, 2001). This 
approach would have the added benefit of keeping the effects icons can have on the 
perceptions of embodied actors involved in negotiations in concrete situations.  
Ultimately, however, Peircean semeiotics can only help us operationalize a 
subsection of the vast array of claims the New Materialist scholarship makes, namely 
those which relate to the role of signs and signification. Beyond providing the material 
for signification, matter performs other roles. In one of those roles things are tools with 
which we undertake certain actions. We then usually perceive things according to their 
“affordances”: the opportunities for use they provide us with. Thus a chair provides us 
with the opportunity to sit on it or stand on it in order to reach higher. While the 
affordances of things can be tied to a thing’s sign dimension, as was the case in the GDP 
example, they do not have to be, and other analytical tools might be needed to study 
them.     
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